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Risky Retirement Business
I. INTRODUCTION
When Enron Corporation collapsed in late 2001, many of the
company's employees lost all or part of their retirement savings. At the
same time, they were losing their jobs, health insurance, and other
benefits of employment. The reason so many workers lost their
retirement savings when Enron went bankrupt was that a large portion
of their stake in the company's retirement plans was invested in Enron' s
own stock.1
Since Enron's downfall, many have commented on the dangers that
arise when "401(k)"-type retirement plans are structured, as was
Enron's largest plan, to invest substantially in the stock of the
employing company.2  In simple terms, such investment over-
concentrates the worker-participants' retirement savings in a single
investment, exposing them to a dangerous level of investment risk.
Employees could avoid this peril if their retirement plan assets were in a
properly diversified portfolio instead.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPs")-retirement plans that
invest almost entirely in stock of the employing company3-greatly
intensify the under-diversification problem. From a diversification
perspective, ESOPs are "Enron on steroids," because they concentrate
an even larger portion of each participant's retirement savings in
employer stock. There are roughly six times as many 401(k)
participants as ESOP participants, but the ESOP participants have about
three times as much money invested in employer stock: to the tune of
some $800 billion.4 Moreover, the portion of 401(k) assets invested in
1. More than half of the assets in Enron's 401(k) retirement plan were invested in Enron stock,
In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative, & ERISA Litigation, No. MDL 1446, Civ.A. H-01-
3913, 2006 WL 1662596, at *4 n. 12 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 2006), and the plan lost some $1.3 billion,
David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership, I SEATrLE J. SOC. JUSTICE 113,
118 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi et al., The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k)
Plans, 50 J.L. & ECON. 45, 53-56 (2007) (discussing employees' understanding of the risk of
owning company's stock); Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security
Privatization, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 53, 71-77 (2004) ("some 30 [percent] of 401(k) assets are
invested in the sponsoring corporation's stock"); Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan
Investments in Employer Securities, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 539 (2002) (arguing that
"more regulation of 401(k) investments in employer securities is warranted and that such
regulation must involve more than just disclosure and education").
3. See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (2006) (defining employee stock ownership plan in part as a plan
"designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities").
4. There are approximately 10 million ESOP participants in the U.S., and, in 2006, there were
over 57 million participants in 401(k) and profit sharing plans. See THE ESOP ASSOCIATION,
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employer stock has been declining for some years. 5  By definition,
ESOPs continue to invest most of their assets in employer stock, and the
total assets at stake have increased over time.6
ESOP participants can do well as long as the company's stock price
rises, but if the company runs into difficulties, ESOP participants are
dramatically more vulnerable than participants in better-diversified
retirement plans. For example, when UAL Corporation, which is the
parent company of United Airlines, experienced heavy losses and went
bankrupt in 2001-2002, participants in its ESOP permanently lost about
$2 billion in stock value.7 Even for the average ESOP participant
whose company does not go "belly-up," the ESOP's lack of
diversification can significantly reduce the funds available for
retirement.
In addition to extreme under-diversification, ESOPs create numerous
opportunities for company insiders to advance their own interests at the
expense of the workers whom the ESOP supposedly benefits. Company
insiders and the "fiduciaries" they choose to represent the participants
ESOP STATISTICS, http://www.esopassociation.org/media/media-statistics.asp (last visited Feb.
16, 2009) (giving figure of 10 million ESOP participants); COREY ROSEN, THE NAT'L CTR. FOR
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, THE EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP UPDATE,
http://www.nceo.org/main/column.php/id/247 (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (stating figure of 11.2
million participants, of whom 630,000 belonged to profit sharing plans invested primarily in
employer stock, rather than ESOPs); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2006 FORM 5500 ANNUAL
REPORTS 41 (2008) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR 2006] (reporting number of participants in
"401(k)-type" plans). ESOP assets have been estimated at about $800 billion, while employer
stock in 401(k)-type plans was roughly $230 billion in 2006. THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, supra
(estimating $800 billion in ESOP assets); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR 2006, supra, at 45 (estimating
$229,947,000,000 in employer stock in 401(k)-type plans in 2006). ESOPs generally maintain a
small portion of their assets outside employer stock, but the total invested in such stock is still
huge.
5. See Jack VanDerhei et al., 401(k) Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity in
2006, 308 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 26 (Aug. 2007) (reporting
decline in share of 401(k) account assets invested in company stock from 19 percent in 1996 to
I 1 percent in 2006); William J. Wiatrowski, 401(k) Plans Move Away from Employer Stock as
Investment Vehicle, 131 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3-10 (2008) (highlighting the large decreases
between 1985 and 2005 in 401(k) plans allowing investment in employer stock).
6. In 2003, for example, total ESOP assets were just over $620 billion, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN:
ABSTRACT OF 2003 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS 50 (2006), compared to $800 billion in 2006,
see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR 2006, supra note 4. It is safe to assume that total ESOP assets have
leveled off or declined with the severe market setbacks of 2008-2009, but the longer-term
increases are the point.
7. See Summers v. UAL Corp., No. 03 C 1537, 2005 WL 2648670, at *1 (N.D. I11. Oct. 12,
2005), affd sub nom. Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2006). The
ESOP at UAL, which actually consisted of two separate ESOPs, was terminated in 2003.
Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust, 920 F. Supp. 924, 925 (N.D. 111. 1996), affd, 104 F.3d 105,
106 (7th Cir. 1997); In re UAL Corp., 412 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 2005).
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face myriad conflicts of interest, from decisions to institute an ESOP, to
determinations about whether and at what price the ESOP should buy
shares of company stock, to choices about how to vote the shares held
in the ESOP.
Despite these problems, federal law encourages employers to adopt
ESOPs through tax incentives and exceptions from the rules that govern
other retirement plans. ESOP advocates defend this favorable
treatment, insisting that ESOPs are good for workers. Their arguments
take two basic forms, both of which share the notion that ESOPs are
instruments of economic democratization. The first type of argument,
once common but currently rare, asserts that ESOPs promote
"democratic capitalism" by turning the great mass of workers into
owners of capital and reducing wealth and income disparities. The
second, more current argument is that ESOPs empower worker-
participants with a greater sense of ownership and commitment with
respect to their employers and their work. In turn, the argument goes,
this changed attitude leads to increases in worker satisfaction and
productivity, which enable employers to keep workers employed for
longer and to compensate them better.
After more than five decades of experience with ESOPs, however,
there is little evidence to support these claimed benefits. Today, even
ESOP advocates concede that ESOPs do not significantly alter existing
patterns of wealth or income distribution. As to the more modest claims
of enhanced satisfaction and productivity, empirical studies are at best
inconclusive and do not show that any benefits for workers are clearly
traceable to ESOPs as such.
Even if there were compelling evidence that ESOPs help workers in
any or all of the ways advocates claim they do, we should balance such
benefits against the costs of forcing workers to participate in
undiversified retirement plans rife with conflicts of interest. The
problem would be somewhat less severe if workers were otherwise
diversified, but workers who participate in ESOPs tend to have little or
no capital investment outside their homes and retirement plans.8 Thus,
8. In 2002, nearly 52 percent of American households owned some stock, either directly,
indirectly, or beneficially; of those households, however, 66 percent held stock through
employer-based retirement plans, and only 17 percent held stock both through such plans and
directly. Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs,
Other SOPs, and "Ownership Societies," 92 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 875 (2006-2007). As of
2001, the bottom 80 percent of Americans in terms of total wealth held only 10.7 percent of all
stock. G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA, Sep. 2005,
http://sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (last visited May 20, 2009) (citing
Edward N. Wolff, Changes in Household Wealth in the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S. (2004)
(unpublished manuscript)). In 2004, however, the bottom 90 percent held 41.7 percent of all
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ESOPs place in jeopardy the retirement savings of those least able to
bear the risks of non-diversification and inherent conflicts of interest.
On balance, incentivizing ESOPs does Workers much more harm than
good.
Part II explains why ESOPs are inherently risky retirement
investment vehicles and outlines the federal law that permits and
encourages ESOPs. Then, Part III describes the conflicts of interest
inherent to ESOPs. Part IV critically addresses the claim by ESOP
advocates that ESOPs promote economic democratization. Part V
considers various reform strategies for addressing the problems
identified. Part VI briefly addresses implications for other areas of
inquiry, and Part VII concludes.
II. ESOPs, NON-DIVERSIFICATION, AND FEDERAL LAW
The ESOP at United Airlines' ("United") corporate parent, UAL,
arose from a background of labor turmoil and poor profits.9  In
exchange for the ESOP's ownership of a majority share in the company,
the unions representing United's pilots and mechanics, as well as some
non-unionized employees, accepted lower pay and poorer fringe
benefits.10 Even though the 18,000-member flight attendants' union
declined to participate,1' United insiders and government officials alike
celebrated the ESOP arrangement. The chairman of the company's
board of directors said United had "forged a link between each
employee and every activity and the overall health of this company. We
no longer have employees working for a company; we have employees
who are the company."' 12 Labor Secretary Robert Reich commented
that, "[flrom here on in, it will be impossible for a board of directors to
not consider employee ownership as one potential business strategy." 13
As noted above, the tragic end of the UAL ESOP story is that the
participants lost about $2 billion in just over a year. 14 But even when
pension account assets. Id. (citing Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the
United States: Rising Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze 27 (The Levy Economics Institute of
Bard College, Working Paper No. 502, 2007)). The bottom 80 percent in 2004 held only 7.5
percent of the nation's financial wealth, which excludes home equity but includes cash surrender
value of retirement plan accounts. Id.
9. Summers, 920 F. Supp. at 925.
10. Summers, 104 F.3d at 106; Adam Bryant, After 7 Years, Employees Win United Airlines,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1994, at Al.
11. Union Ends UAL Talks, N.Y. TtMES, Aug. 31, 1994, at D4.
12. Bryant, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. Summers v. UAL Corp., No. 03 C 1537, 2005 WL 2648670, at *1 (N.D. I11. Oct. 12,
2005), aff'd sub nom. Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2006).
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the companies and the numbers are smaller, participants stand to suffer
greatly. For instance, a mail-order company called Foster & Gallagher,
Inc. went under in the late 1990s, and the net value of the shares held in
its ESOP fell from $82 million to zero.15 As a result, the employees lost
their jobs and current benefits, and the ESOP's more than 4,000
participants also lost a great deal of their retirement savings, all in a
single stroke. 16 In another published case, ESOP participants at Kroy,
Inc.-which was in the printing and typography business-lost $35.25
million in stock value when the company went bankrupt. 17 These
examples illustrate how the failure of an ESOP company can deprive
workers of their employment, current benefits, and retirement savings.
Participants in the ESOP at the Tribune Company escaped serious
loss to their retirement savings, but only because the ESOP had not been
in place for very long when the giant publishing company filed for
bankruptcy. 18  Nonetheless, Tribune employees still paid because, in
setting up the ESOP, Tribune cut back its contributions to the
company's 401 (k) retirement plan. 19 Thus, when the company stock the
ESOP held became essentially worthless, the employees suffered a net
loss of retirement savings.
Of course, some ESOP companies perform well, and, so long as it
lasts, that rising tide benefits the ESOP's participants as they retire and
"cash out" the employer stock that they hold through the plan. The
possibility of favorable results for some fortunate ESOP participants,
however, is part and parcel of ESOPs' radical under-diversification.
Moreover, even in companies that do not collapse, ESOPs on average
15. See Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 818, 824, 861 (C.D. Ill. 2004), aff'd, 419
F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that any loss to ESOP was not caused by any breach of
fiduciary duty by trustee in relying on inadequate legal due diligence conducted by counsel). In
the interest of full disclosure, I was one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in the Keach case.
16. See id. Regarding the number of participants, see Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2,
Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., 419 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1901), 2004 WL 3760879.
17. Reich v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 837 F. Supp. 1259, 1262, 1270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
The court in Reich determined that the ESOP suffered only $17.25 million in damages because it
had repaid $17.5 million of the $35.5 million purchase price of its shares, and it received
$250,000 for the shares in the Kroy bankruptcy. The Kroy ESOP's original investment of $17.5
million was worth nothing at the time of the collapse of Kroy. Id. at 1288-89.
18. See COREY ROSEN, THE NAT'L CTR. FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, WHAT WILL HAPPEN
TO THE ESOP IN THE TRIBUNE BANKRUPTCY?, http://www.nceo.orgllibrary/tfibune-esop-
bankruptcy.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); see also Emily Thornton, Tribune Bankruptcy
Snares Employees, Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/dec2008/db2008128_376528.htm?chan=t
op+news-top+news+index+-+temp-news+%2B+analysis (explaining the short time the
Tribune's ESOP was in place before the company declared bankruptcy).
19. See Thornton, supra note 18.
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leave workers worse off than they would be with a diversified
retirement plan.
A. ESOPs and Non-Diversification
Diversification is a fundamental principle of sound investment.
ESOPs, by definition, are not diversified, meaning they expose their
participants to a great deal of investment risk. That risk, moreover,
provides no benefit to the participants in comparison with more
diversified investments.
Under the widely accepted "modem portfolio theory," investments
are considered not individually, but as part of a portfolio of
investments. 20 Every investment has an expected rate of return, as well
as an associated level of risk that the actual return will be less than the
expected return. 21 Some of that risk is "market" or "systematic" risk,
meaning it is inherent to the capital market system and cannot be
diversified away. 22 Significant portions of the risk of any investment,
however, are either "specific" risks peculiar to the firm invested in or
risks associated with investments in a given industry or sector of the
economy.23 Investors can reduce the latter two types of risk, referred to
together as "residual" risks, by diversifying their investments. 24 In
other words, investors can, in large part, guard against residual risks by
investing some of their money in other enterprises, industries, and
sectors that have different sets of residual risks. 25
For purposes of this Article, the key insight of modern portfolio
theory is that, for any single investment, one can select a diversified
portfolio of investments that provides the same expected return, but
with a lower level of risk. An investor in a single stock or other
investment has an expected return that correlates to the market's
20. ROBERT L. HAGIN, THE Dow JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY 143
(1979).
21. Seeid. at 99-102, 183.
22. See id. at 101-02; Robert J. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, The New Prudent Investor Rule
and the Modem Portfolio Theory: A New Direction for Fiduciaries, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 39, 59
(1996) (explaining that non-diversifiable risk "includes changes in inflation and interest rates that
affect the whole economy"); Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment
and Modem Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 87, 101 (1990) (explaining that "all stocks are
affected by this risk in the same way, albeit in different degrees").
23. HAGIN, supra note 20, at 101-02.
24. Id. at 102, 183. Additional names for residual risk include "unsystematic" and "selection"
risks. Id. at 183.
25. Id. at 101-03. In slightly more technical terms, the investor should seek investments that
"covary negatively" to as great a degree as possible with respect to the firm- and industry-specific
risks they entail. See Haskell, supra note 22, at 101-02.
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valuation of that investment's market risk.26 In an efficient market,
higher levels of market risk correlate with higher expected returns.27
Because well-informed investors can diversify away residual risk, the
system of capital markets compensates investors only for taking on
market/systematic risks; it does not provide additional returns for taking
on residual risks.28
If an investor puts all of her money in a single investment, then, she
has incurred residual risk in addition to the market risk, but she receives
no additional return to compensate for that risk.29  As a result,
investment in a single security can never be "efficient," meaning that it
can never be the investment choice with "the lowest level of transaction
costs and risks for a particular expected return[,] or vice versa." 30
A concentrated investment in employer stock increases the worker's
risk of catastrophic loss in the event the employer's business collapses.
Even if a catastrophe does not occur, though, undiversified investments
cause workers real harm. Due to the fact that the stock's return is
determined by the company's market risk, and the investor receives no
additional return for the residual (that is, diversifiable) risk, the stock's
return is insufficient to compensate the investor for the full amount of
market and residual risk she bears. 31 As a result, a large investment in
employer stock that the employee holds for a long period has an
effective value of far less than the stock's market value. 32 For workers
with large portions of their pension savings in employer stock over a
26. Haskell, supra note 22, at 102.
27. See, e.g., Aalberts & Poon, supra note 22, at 59-60 ("[Tlhe capital market will reward
securities according to their betas, but not their standard deviation or stand alone risks.").
28. Id. at 183; Haskell, supra note 22, at 101-03.
29. Haskell, supra note 22, at 102-03.
30. Aalberts & Poon, supra note 22, at 65.
31. See Lisa Meulbroek, Company Stock in Pension Plans: How Costly Is It? 15 (Harvard
Bus. School, Working Paper No. 02-058, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=303782 (stating that in order to provide
adequate compensation to undiversified employees, "the expected return on company stock
would need to be commensurate with its total volatility"); see also Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen
P. Utkus, Company Stock and Retirement Plan Diversification 35 (Pension Research Council,
Working Paper 2002-4, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.cornsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=304461 (projecting that over 30-year period,
diversified portfolios would have just over twice median value of portfolio composed of 100
percent company stock). Cf William E. Even & David A. Macpherson, Pension Investments in
Employer Stock 23-33 (IZA Discussion Paper No. 2376, Oct. 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=941 110 (finding negative effects on portfolio
performance concentrated in hypothetical portfolios with between 50 and 100 percent of
employer stock).
32. Meulbroek, supra note 31, at 25-26, cited in Benartzi et al., supra note 2, at 47, 49-50.
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number of years, the effective value can be far less than 50 cents on the
dollar.33
From the perspective of sensible investment principles, therefore,
ESOPs are anathema. They concentrate participants' retirement savings
in the stock of a single employer, thereby exposing those savings to the
full range of industry- and firm-specific risks associated with that stock.
But the non-diversification problem does not end there. ESOPs also
make workers' retirement savings dependent on the exact same set of
risks that already affect most participants' current income and non-
retirement benefits, including such vital resources as health insurance.
If the employing company falls on hard times, it is likely to carry out
layoffs at the same time that its stock's value is declining.3 4  The
workers who lose their jobs and, therefore, their current benefits, will
simultaneously face a decline in the value of their retirement accounts.
Given that workers in dire financial straits might need to take loans
from retirement savings in order to cover short-term needs, the drop in
stock value comes at a particularly inopportune moment.35 If the
decline worsens and the employer fails, ESOP participants stand to lose
nearly everything all at once: their jobs, their health insurance and other
current benefits, and their retirement savings.
From a diversification perspective, a worker would be better off if the
fiduciaries of his retirement plan randomly selected a single stock other
than that of the employing company and invested all of the worker's
retirement savings in that stock. The worker's investments would still
be radically under-diversified, but at least they would not be tied to the
same company as his pay and current benefits.
When confronted with ESOPs' inherent, radical under-
diversification, ESOP advocates like to point out that a fair number of
companies with ESOPs also have a 401(k) or some other, more
diversified plan. 36 Assuming its accuracy, this notion inadequately
addresses the under-diversification problem. A study ESOP advocates
frequently cite, conducted among companies in the state of Washington,
showed that workers who participated in both an ESOP and another
33. Id. at 25-26.
34. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 76 (stating that the decline of a company's stock value often
reflects negative economic situation in the company, which, in turn, leads to employee layoffs as
well).
35. See id. at 77 ("[E]mployees may need to tap their retirement plan's assets to pay for living
costs, health care expenses, and the like.").
36. See, e.g., COREY ROSEN ET AL., EQUITY: WHY EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IS GOOD FOR
BUSINESS 14-15 (2005) (claiming that "more than 80 percent" of ESOP companies offer
"diversified 401 (k) plans or other diversified retirement programs" to employees).
[Vol. 41
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plan had an average of. 60 percent of their total retirement savings in
employer stock.37 Leading ESOP advocates concede that anything
more than 20 percent is "probably too much concentration in a single
asset."38  Thus, merely having an additional plan available does not
adequately remedy ESOPs' under-diversification.
B. Federal Law Exceptions and Incentives for ESOPs
Over the years, federal law has taken some steps toward recognizing
the importance of diversification in retirement savings. At each stage,
however, Congress has exempted ESOPs from the resulting rules. For
example, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), the fiduciaries controlling a retirement plan's assets
ordinarily have a duty to diversify the plan's investments. 39 That duty,
however, does not extend to investments in employer stock by ESOPs
and most other "defined contribution" plans,40 including 401 (k) plans.41
37. PETER A. KARDAS ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, WEALTH & INCOME
EFFECTS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (1988), available at http://dept.kent.
edu/oeoc/PublicationsResearch/Suml999/WealthSum1999.html. Citations of this study by ESOP
advocates tend to emphasize findings that ESOP companies in the study provided higher wages
and benefits than non-ESOP "counterparts." See, e.g., THE ESOP ASS'N, CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE, http://www.esopassociation.org/media/media-corporate.asp (last visited May 20,
2009).
38. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 15.
39. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(l)(C) (2006) (requiring fiduciaries to "diversify[] the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do
so").
40. Federal law divides retirement plans into "defined benefit" plans and "defined
contribution" (or "individual account") plans. A defined contribution plan "provides for an
individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed
to the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of
accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's account." Id. § 3(34),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). A defined benefit plan is, with some simplification, any plan that is not a
defined contribution plan. Id. § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35). As the names suggest, defined
benefit plans promise a certain output, in the form of benefits, whereas defined contribution plans
promise a certain input, in the form of contributions to participants' accounts.
41. Id. § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (exempting "eligible individual account plans"
from duty to diversify with respect to employer stock); id. § 407(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3)
(defining "eligible individual account plan"). In the 401(k) context, most plans today allow
participants to direct their own investments, at least as to amounts participants invest by way of
salary deferrals. If the plan implements participant direction properly, the plan's fiduciaries are
not responsible for the consequences of participants' investment choices. See id. § 404(c), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(c) (addressing fiduciary duties). They often remain responsible, however, for
employer "matching" contributions made in the form of employer stock, which is where they
benefit from being exempt from the fiduciary diversification requirement. ESOP fiduciaries
make all the plan's investment decisions and simply could not maintain the plan as an ESOP if
the diversification duty applied.
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In addition, federal regulations require that fiduciaries consider the
place of individual investments within the plan's larger portfolio-an
apparent nod in the direction of modem portfolio theory.42  Like the
diversification rule, however, this requirement exempts ESOPs and
other defined contribution plans when it comes to investment in
employer stock.43
In the wake of Enron's meltdown, Congress passed new laws for
401(k) and similar retirement plans, mandating that participants have
the option to diversify their investments out of employer stock.4 Those
new diversification requirements, though, do not apply to ESOPs.45
Instead, ESOPs remain subject to a much more limited, pre-Enron
diversification requirement.46
Besides exempting ESOPs from the most significant diversification
rules, Congress also actively encourages companies and their insiders to
adopt and keep ESOPs. ESOP companies receive several major tax
incentives not available to other, better diversified retirement plans. To
mention only one example, when a shareholder sells stock to an ESOP
that owns, after the transaction, at least 30 percent of the company, the
42. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(1)(i) (2009) (requiring fiduciaries to "give[] appropriate
consideration to ... the role [an] investment . . . plays in that portion of the plan's investment
portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties"). For a discussion of the
impact of modem portfolio theory on non-ERISA fiduciary investing, see Aalberts & Poon, supra
note 22, at 39.
43. In addition to exempting ESOPs' holding of employer stock from the specific duty to
diversify, Section 404(a)(2) also lifts "the prudence requirement (only to the extent that it requires
diversification) of paragraph [404(a)](l)(B)." ERISA § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). The
regulatory requirement that fiduciaries consider how an investment relates to the plan's portfolio
clarifies the § 404(a)(l)(B) prudence requirement. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(1)(i)
(explaining the investment duties of the fiduciary).
44. Put simply, non-ESOP defined contribution plans that hold publicly traded employer stock
must now allow participants to diversify all of their own plan contributions out of employer stock
immediately and to diversify the employer's contributions after a participant has been part of the
plan for three years. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(35) (2006) (detailing the diversification requirements for
certain defined contribution plans); ERISA § 2040), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(j) (outlining the
diversification requirements for certain individual account plans). Plans that permit participants
to direct the investment of their own accounts must also provide participants with information
regarding the importance of retirement investment diversification. See ERISA §§ 101(m),
105(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(m) (containing the notice of right to invest), 1025(a)(2)(B)
(describing the requirements to provide pension benefit statements).
45. I.R.C. § 401(a)(35)(E) (defining "applicable defined contribution plan[s]" to which
diversification rules apply).
46. An ESOP does not need to provide any opportunity to diversify at all until a participant
reaches age fifty-five and has at least 10 years of participation in the ESOP. Id. § 401(a)(28).
Even then, the plan only has to let the participant diversify one-quarter of what he has in the plan.
Id. At age sixty, the portion expands to one-half. id.
Risky Retirement Business
shareholder can defer paying tax on any gain realized in the sale, merely
by buying other securities with the proceeds. 4
7
As a result of the incentives, ESOPs appear to many employers and
company insiders as an attractive means of accomplishing a variety of
goals, only a few of which have anything to do with providing
employees with secure retirement savings. In addition, as discussed in
the next Part, these incentives also give rise to a host of conflict of
interest problems.
III. ESOPs AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
ESOPs create a range of serious conflicts of interest that either do not
affect other retirement plans, or affect them to a lesser degree.
Moreover, those additional conflicts are not necessary to the central
ERISA goal of maintaining secure, employer-based retirement plans.48
47. See id. § 1042 (discussing requirements to qualify for nonrecognition of gain). In
addition, ESOPs receive other tax advantages. In other types of "tax-qualified" retirement plans,
the employer may deduct from its gross income its contributions to the plan, up to certain limits.
Id. § 404(a)(3). An ESOP sponsor may exceed those limits if the contributions go to pay down
the loan used to acquire the ESOP's shares of employer stock: it may deduct payments of loan
principal up to similar limits, but it may deduct without limit payments of interest on the loan. Id.
§ 404(a)(9). In addition, the sponsoring company may deduct any dividends paid on stock held
by the ESOP, whether the dividends go to the participants or go to pay down the ESOP loan. See
id. § 404(k) (addressing the deduction for dividends paid on certain employer securities). Beyond
the benefits to companies and insiders, tax law also privileges participants in ESOPs. A
participant taking a lump sum distribution of employer stock from an ESOP at retirement does
not have to pay ordinary income tax on any "net unrealized appreciation" on the employer stock
over and above the price the ESOP paid for the shares. Id. § 402(e)(4)(B). Instead, the
participant pays tax on the appreciation at the lower long-term capital gains rate, whenever she
sells the employer stock. See LOUIS 0. KELSO & PATRICIA H. KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND
ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING THE ESOP REVOLUTION 62 (1986) ("All income taxation of
employees on the value of ESOP-acquired stock is deferred from the time the ESOP pays for their
stock until the time the employee retires or separates from the employer."). If she passes the
stock onto her heirs, they get a "step-up" in basis, meaning no tax will be paid on the
appreciation.
Congress in 1996 repealed a provision allowing entities lending money to ESOPs for purchases
of employer stock to deduct up to fifty percent of the interest received from their taxable income.
See I.R.C. § 133 repealed by Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188 §
1602(c), 110 Stat. 1833 (1996) (detailing that interest on certain loans is used to acquire employer
securities). The numbers of ESOPs and participants, however, continue to grow, and some three-
quarters of ESOPs in existence either are or have been leveraged. See NAT'L CTR. FOR
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP,
http://www.nceo.org/library/eo-stat.htm (Feb. 2008) (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (citing 9,225
ESOPs "and equivalent plans" in 1993, 7,600 in 1999, and 9,774 in 2007, with increase in
participants from 7.5 million to 11.2 million between 1993 and 2007); THE ESOP ASSOCIATION,
supra note 4 (stating that at least seventy-five percent of ESOP companies are or were leveraged,
meaning they used borrowed funds to acquire the ESOP's employer securities).
48. ERISA is generally understood as having dual goals: protecting employee benefits and
encouraging employers to maintain benefit plans. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct.
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These "extra" conflicts mean ESOP participants are more vulnerable
than necessary to being victimized by the company and its insiders.
This Part will describe the three areas of additional conflict that ESOPs
create. First, it will address conflicts relating to the formation of
ESOPs. Second, it will outline the conflicts involving ESOP
transactions in employer stock. Third, it will explain conflicts
connected to voting the ESOP's shares of employer stock. Finally, this
Part will explain how ESOPs differ from other retirement plans with
respect to conflicts of interest and will then conclude that the additional
conflicts associated with ESOPs are unnecessary in light of ERISA's
central purposes.
A. Conflicts of Interest Relating to ESOP Formation
The first conflict of interest arises when company insiders decide
whether to form an ESOP as opposed to some other, more diversified
type of retirement plan. Plan formation decisions are not subject to the
limits ERISA places on the conduct of plan fiduciaries. 49 Other ERISA
rules, which on their face seem to prohibit ESOPs, contain exceptions
specifically designed to allow them.50  As a result, an employer can
institute a plan that requires workers to invest their retirement savings
solely in employer stock, it can do so for reasons that have nothing to do
with improving the lot of the workers, and the workers have no grounds
under the statute to complain. 5'
The decision by an employer to institute an ESOP involves a number
of potential considerations that are unique to ESOPs. First, an ESOP
can be an effective means of raising capital. As many as seventy-five
2343, 2349 (2008) (noting "Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their
benefits") (citation omitted); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (describing
"Congress' ... desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or
litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first
place").
49. Those decisions are not subject to the ERISA fiduciary rules because, unlike the
administration of an existing plan and the management of its assets, they are considered "settlor"
rather than "fiduciary" decisions. See, e.g., Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996)
(stating rule that employers, in adopting, modifying, or terminating retirement plan, "do not act as
fiduciaries... but are analogous to the settlors of a trust...").
50. See ERISA §§ 406(a)(l)(A), (B), (E), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(l)(A), (B), (E) (2006) (listing
"prohibited transactions," including "lending of money or other extension of credit between the
plan and a party in interest" and "acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of any employer security...
in violation of [a provision limiting employer stock to ten percent of a plan's assets]"); id. §§
408(b)(3), (e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1108(b)(3), (e) (removing ESOP loans and share transactions from
realm of prohibited transactions).
51. To be sure, some-perhaps even many-insiders might genuinely believe ESOP
advocates' claims that implementing an ESOP will be good for the employees as well as for the
company and its high-level insiders.
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percent of ESOPs are "leveraged," meaning that the plan borrows the
money with which the ESOP buys company stock.52 When the ESOP
buys treasury stock, the company obtains debt financing with all the
aforementioned tax advantages. 53  Those advantages can make a
leveraged ESOP a source of capital preferable to other forms of debt
financing and to equity financing. 54 Because ESOPs are the only type
of tax-qualified retirement plan allowed to borrow money, this incentive
does not arise with other plans.
Particularly in non-publicly traded companies, an ESOP can also be
an attractive device for succession planning. A sole or majority owner
of such a company who wishes to retire, or merely to diversify his
holdings, can benefit from selling to an ESOP instead of some other
purchaser. 55 For instance, the owner can defer indefinitely taxation on
the capital gains from the sale, which can be a gigantic boon.56 Other
kinds of retirement plans, including 401(k) plans, do not carry the same
tax advantages. Furthermore, 401(k) plans that invest in employer stock
are more common in publicly, rather than non-publicly, traded
companies.
57
52. See THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, supra note 4 ("At least 75 percent of ESOP companies are
or were leveraged ...."). For a basic description of a leveraged ESOP structure, see Hockett,
supra note 8, at 888. Note, however, that in some leveraged ESOP transactions it is company
insiders, rather than the company itself, who sell stock to the ESOP; in such transactions, the
borrowed funds flow to insiders rather than to the company.
53. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; Hunter C. Blum, Comment, ESOP's Fables:
Leveraged ESOPs and Their Effect on Managerial Slack, Employee Risk and Motivation in the
Public Corporation, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1539, 1546 (1997) (describing benefits of ESOPs as
methods of capital formation). One estimate is that the tax advantages of ESOPs can reduce the
cost of borrowing by as much as thirty-four percent. Ellen E. Schultz, Tribune Filing Exposes
Risks of ESOPs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2008, at B6.
55. See generally, e.g., ROBERT A. FRISCH, ESOP: THE ULTIMATE INSTRUMENT IN
SUCCESSION PLANNING (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the rules by which ESOPs are governed and
the situations in which ESOPs can be applied). Frisch, who runs a company specializing in
implementing and managing ESOPs, id. at v, extols the succession-planning virtues of ESOPs in
chapters with titles such as "How Mr. Big Sold His Company Tax Free and Still Kept It," id.
at 173.
56. I.R.C. § 1042 (2006); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
57. The reasons for this tendency include I.R.C. § 401(a)(22), which requires most defined
contributions plans with more than ten percent of assets in employer stock that is not "readily
tradable on an established market" to pass through voting in compliance with I.R.C. § 409(e).
See infra note 77 and accompanying text. In addition, a plan that allows participants to direct
their own investments can shield plan fiduciaries from liability for any negative consequences of
participants' decisions. See ERISA § 404(c)(l)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
That shield, however, does not apply with respect to any participant instruction to acquire or sell
employer stock that is not publicly traded. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(d)(2)(ii)(E)(4)(iii) (2009).
Some companies opt for an arrangement known as a "KSOP," which combines an ESOP and a
401 (k).
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Moreover, an ESOP can enable insiders to control the company
without maintaining a large personal investment in its stock. The rules
for voting of ESOP shares, described below, can make the ESOP into a
"captive" block of stock subject to the will of the insiders.58 Sam Zell,
for instance, became the controlling voice in the Tribune Company even
though he invested only about $315 million in the purchase of the
company, which sold at over $8 billion.59 The rest of the money came
from a complex, leveraged ESOP arrangement.
60
In a publicly held company, ESOP purchases of stock can provide
support for the share price that might further serve the interests of
insiders. Higher stock prices can raise insiders' compensation, both by
making their stock options worth more and by triggering bonuses or
other incentives tied to stock performance. 61 In addition, higher stock
value can assist insiders in achieving desired mergers and acquisitions,
because they can often provide the target company's shareholders with
stock in the acquiring company rather than cash for at least part of the
purchase price.62
All these interests increase the likelihood that companies will choose
an ESOP over some other type of retirement plan. ESOPs' lack of
diversification means that, viewed ex ante, they can never be in the
participants' best interests. 63 For the lucky participants in some ESOPs,
the plan will turn out to have been beneficial in comparison to a more
diversified plan, but the same would be true if the employer decided to
invest workers' retirement assets exclusively in some other company's
stock, or even in lottery tickets. The company insiders' choice to start
an ESOP, instead of a more diversified plan, means workers are less
likely to have sufficient retirement resources. Choosing an ESOP, then,
reflects either a misunderstanding of the workers' best interests or a
deliberate subordination of those interests to the interests of the
company and the insiders.
B. Conflicts of Interest in ESOP Transactions in Employer Stock
Further conflicts of interest arise in connection with an ESOP's
decision to buy or sell particular shares of employer stock, either at the
58. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
59. Thornton, supra note 18.
60. Id.
61. As to the stock options point, see Kaplan, supra note 2, at 73.
62. Id. at 73-74 (explaining that the acquiring company can avoid or lessen the need to raise
cash for the acquisition by using its own stock for all or part of the purchase price).
63. See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
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time of formation or later. The plan's fiduciaries must decide whether
to complete the transaction and, if so, at what share price.
If the company's stock is publicly traded, as is the norm with 401(k)
plans, then determining the share price is relatively straightforward. 64
But if the stock is not publicly traded, as is the case in nearly all ESOP
companies, the determination becomes more complicated. 65 In non-
publicly traded businesses, the company and its insiders are naturally
the persons who have stock available; accordingly, either the company
or the insiders are the ones proposing to sell shares of stock to the
ESOP. Valuing stock that is not publicly traded is, at best, an inexact
science,66 and insiders naturally tend to prefer the highest price they (or
the company) can get. The higher the share price, however, the fewer
shares the ESOP will receive in exchange for the same initial
investment of cash or debt. For most participants, therefore, a lower
transaction share price is beneficial.67
In response to the rather apparent conflicts of interest, insiders of
non-publicly traded companies typically find it necessary to hire a third
party to act as an "independent fiduciary" and evaluate the proposed
stock purchase on behalf of the ESOP's participants. 68  The outside
fiduciary, in turn, often hires a valuation firm to value the company and
help decide whether the proposed share price is "adequate."
69
64. ESOPs and other "eligible individual account plans" may transact in employer stock so
long as no commission is charged on the transaction, and the transaction is for "adequate
consideration." ERISA § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e) (2006). For securities with a "generally
recognized market," adequate consideration means the price at which the security trades on a
registered exchange or a price no less favorable to the plan than the current bid and asked prices
quoted by independent parties. Id. § 3(18), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(18).
65. See THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, supra note 4 (stating that only three percent of all ESOPs
are in publicly traded companies, although those companies employ just under half of "the
nation's 10 million employee owners").
66. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 3.01 (recognizing valuation of shares in closely
held companies is "not an exact science").
67. Participants who stand to retire very soon after the transaction might be indifferent to the
transaction price, because the price at which they "cash out" any shares in their ESOP accounts
will largely be driven by the transaction price. (If the transaction is leveraged, the cash out price
will be lower than the transaction price, due to the company's taking on or guaranteeing the
ESOP's purchase price debt). For those who retire later, however, a lower transaction price
means more shares in the ESOP and more shares allocated to their accounts as the debt is paid
down, which in turn means more cash for any given enterprise value at the time they retire. Or, if
the ESOP buys the same number of shares for less money, participants benefit because the ESOP
debt can be retired faster and/or because the company's obligation to service the debt is less, and
the value of the company going forward is correspondingly higher.
68. See, e.g., Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 818, 834-35 (C.D. I11. 2004), afftd, 419
F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing retention of U.S. Trust Company as "independent" trustee to
evaluate proposed share purchase by ESOP).
69. See ERISA § 3(18), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(18) (defining "adequate consideration" for
2009]
Loyola University Chicago Law. Journal
But the process of hiring outside fiduciaries and valuation companies
does not effectively remedy the conflict of interest problem. The same
insiders who stand to benefit from a high stock price also decide who
will fill the fiduciary and valuation roles, usually as members of a
committee set up to administer the ESOP. 70 Fiduciaries and valuation
companies are almost always repeat players in the world of ESOP
transactions, meaning that they are subject to significant pressure to
please company insiders. 71 A provider of "independent" fiduciary
services or a valuation firm that acquires a reputation in the market for
being too independent-that is, for actually looking out for the interests
of the plan participants, instead of those of the company insiders who
make hiring decisions-risks a rapidly dwindling list of clients.72
Simply put, this one-sided dynamic protects the well-being of company
insiders while leaving exposed the workers whom the ESOP is
supposed to benefit.
Unlike decisions about plan formation, decisions about share
purchases and prices are fiduciary decisions under ERISA. 73 But
ERISA's fiduciary rules provide only superficial checks on those
decisions. Sophisticated fiduciaries and valuation experts can usually
"paper the file" sufficiently to justify a share price favorable to the
company and the selling insiders.74 Challenging such determinations in
securities with no recognized market as "the fair market value of the asset as determined in good
faith by the trustee or named fiduciary pursuant to the terms of the plan and in accordance with
regulations").
70. Although the outside fiduciary is the party that formally retains the valuation expert, it is
highly unlikely that the fiduciary would choose a firm that the company insiders opposed.
71. See, e.g., Keach, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (noting that the U.S. Trust had a "Special
Fiduciary Committee" to oversee its service as institutional trustee in transactions involving
ERISA issues and that "[o]nly a few firms and investment brokers provide this kind of
specialized service").
72. There is nothing new about this pattern: a group of ostensibly independent watchdogs or
arbiters favoring the interests of repeat players with either full or partial control over the selection
process. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, The Mother of All Conflicts: Auditors and Their Clients, 29
J. CORP. L. 363, 367-68 (2004) (describing "coziness" of nominally independent auditors with
clients, due in large part to clients' ability to fire auditors who show too much actual
independence); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1066 (2000) (reporting
findings of homogeneity and pro-repeat-player tendencies among arbitrators).
73. See ERISA §§ 406(a)(1)(A), (B), (E), 408(b)(3), (e)(l), 29 U.S.C. §§ l 106(a)(l)(A), (B),
(E), 1108(b)(3), (e)(l) (prohibiting fiduciaries from transactions including ESOP loans and plan
acquisition of employer stock, then removing such prohibitions if, inter alia, purchase is for
"adequate consideration").
74. By "papering the file," I mean documenting such steps as site visits and interviews with
company managers, reviews of industry-related research and publications, complex valuation
methodologies, and reviews of actual or anticipated legal claims involving the company. See,
e.g., Keach, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 836-46 (describing actions taken and documented by trustee and
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court is difficult and costly, and the applicable "good faith" standard
can lead courts to accept the price that results from the fiduciary's
process in the face of participants' claims that the price was too high.7 5
In a sense the process is circular: what counts as a good faith process for
determining the stock's fair market value tends to turn on what other,
similarly conflicted fiduciaries and valuation experts have done in
similar transactions.
C. Conflicts of Interest and Voting of Shares
Finally, ESOPs foment conflicts of interest with respect to the voting
of the ESOP's shares. In publicly held companies, ESOP participants
have the right to vote the shares allocated to their accounts as to all
matters on which other shareholders can vote.76 In non-publicly traded
companies, where some 97 percent of ESOPs exist, the right to vote
allocated shares is limited to certain types of major corporate decisions
and does not extend to "routine" matters such as electing corporate
directors.77
Participants' limited voting rights are further constrained when
ESOPs are leveraged, which is true of as many as three-quarters of all
ESOPs. 78  In a leveraged ESOP, shares are allocated to participants'
accounts only gradually, in proportion to the amount of the loan
principal the ESOP has paid off.7 9 The rest of the shares remain
unallocated, and the ESOP trustee retains discretion to vote those shares
as part of its fiduciary role.80 As a result, the participants in a leveraged
ESOP do not gain the right to vote significant numbers of shares until
valuation company in evaluating proposed ESOP transaction).
75. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc.,
445 F.3d 610, 620-21 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, 569 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting conclusion
that ESOP fiduciary violated duties in approving share transaction at full price demanded by
selling shareholders).
76. I.R.C. § 409(e)(2) (2006). Participant voting is referred to colloquially as "pass-through"
voting.
77. See id. § 409(e)(3) (limiting voting when employer does not have a "registration-type class
of securities" to "the approval or disapproval of any corporate merger or consolidation,
recapitalization, reclassification, liquidation, dissolution, sale of substantially all assets of a trade
or business, or such similar transaction as the Secretary may prescribe in regulations"). A pro-
ESOP organization reports that only about 20 percent of private ESOP companies pass through
full voting rights to participants. NAT'L CTR. FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 47.
78. See THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, supra note 4 ("At least 75% of ESOP companies are or
were leveraged .... ").
79. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3(h) (2009) (detailing the mechanism for determining the
number of shares to be released over the term of the loan).
80. See, e.g., Herman v. NationsBank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 1997)
(discussing "mirror voting" provisions and trustee's responsibility for voting unallocated shares,
as well as allocated shares that participants neglect to vote).
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years after the leveraged transaction, even though the ESOP might own
a majority, or even 100 percent, of the employer's stock. Furthermore,
even as to allocated shares, the trustee continues to vote shares that
participants neglect to vote.
As a result of the limited voting rights afforded participants, company
insiders can maintain effective control over matters committed to
shareholder voting, even though they might directly own only a few
shares or perhaps none at all. The trustee is generally a company
insider or an outsider beholden to company insiders, so control of
shareholder decisions remains with the insiders even if the ESOP holds
a majority of the shares.8 1
It is easy to see why such an arrangement can be attractive to
insiders. In a publicly traded company, an ESOP can provide a secure
reservoir of votes to fend off unwanted takeover attempts. 82 Directors
and managers can use the ESOP's shares to entrench their own
positions: the trustee who is friendly with management votes to reelect
incumbent directors, and the directors continue to employ, and
generously compensate, the same trustee and management team. 83
In a non-publicly traded company, because ESOP participants need
not be allowed to vote even their allocated shares as to most matters,
insiders need to own only a few shares in order to control most voting.
If an owner wishes to complete a transaction as to which pass-through
voting is required, such as a merger or a liquidation of the enterprise,
she can usually rely on a friendly ESOP trustee to deliver the necessary
votes.
The interests of the insiders can easily diverge from those of the
ESOP participants in situations of shareholder voting. 84 To cite only
81. In the Tribune Company purchase, for instance, no one doubted that Sam Zell controlled
the company, even though he did not own any shares. See Thornton, supra note 18.
82. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 54, at 1547; Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership
Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749,
1799-1800 (1990) (opining that managers' desire to protect themselves from hostile takeovers
and direct accountability to workers at least partly explains creation of ESOPs without pass-
through voting).
83. See Brett McDonnell, ESOPs' Failures: Fiduciary Duties When Managers of Employee-
Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 199, 199-200
(2000) (describing director entrenchment when directors appoint members of committee that
votes ESOP's shares).
84. I do not mean to suggest that the interests of the participants are always monolithic.
Different participants might sometimes have interests that diverge from one another; for instance,
participants who are near retirement might favor policies that will enhance stock value and
dividends in the short term, while those who are farther from retirement might prefer policies
with greater potential payoffs that are longer-term. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein,
ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105,
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one example, managers might resist a takeover attempt in order to
preserve their jobs, even though it might be in the participants' best
interests to tender the ESOP's shares at the premium price that the
would-be acquirer is offering.
It is an unsettled question to what degree ERISA's fiduciary rules
apply to voting of unallocated ESOP shares. One federal court of
appeals has held that ERISA fiduciary rules do not apply when a
company director instructs the ESOP trustee to vote the unallocated
shares in favor of the director's reelection. 85 But other cases suggest
that fiduciary duties do apply in similar circumstances. 86 In any event,
fiduciaries will often be able to come up with reasons why their votes
were arguably in the best interests of at least some participants. The
fiduciary rules might catch the most egregious betrayals, but many more
will likely pass unchallenged.
D. How ESOPs Differ from Other Plans
The problem of potentially conflicted insiders and fiduciaries is not in
itself unique to ESOPs. ERISA, however, rather effectively polices
most of the possible conflicts that are common to both ESOPs and other
plans. With respect to plan formation, ERISA limits many types of plan
provisions in order to curb potential abuses. For instance, ERISA
prevents employers from making workers wait years before becoming
plan participants and from making participants wait an inordinately long
time before their retirement benefits "vest" and become non-
forfeitable. 87
Without plan ownership of employer stock to cloud the picture, these
ERISA rules render the tradeoffs for companies considering a new
retirement plan quite straightforward. The company must weigh the
1120-21 (1988) (describing potential differences in interests of younger and older workers).
Although Fischel and Langbein mention a number of interests that are not properly relevant
because they are not interests that participants have as participants, the basic point that
participants' interests are not always identical is sound.
85. See Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 424-25 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that "ERISA
specifically anticipates and authorizes the 'dual role' of directors and plan fiduciaries in the ESOP
context").
86. See, e.g., Newton v. Van Otterloo, 756 F. Supp. 1121, 1128 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (holding that
the right to vote unallocated shares in contested election of incumbent directors was subject to
fiduciary rules).
87. Depending on the plan type, ERISA requires that participants be fully vested in their
accrued benefits after no more than six or seven years of service. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B) (2006); I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(B) (2006). ERISA and the tax code also
provide limits on such matters as age and service requirements for plan participation, benefit
accrual processes, "nondiscrimination" among employees at different levels, etc. See ERISA §§
202,204, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1054; I.R.C. §§ 410(a)-(b), 41 l(b)-(c).
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costs of each type of plan, reduced by the tax benefits, against expected
advantages such as enhanced worker recruitment and retention and
possible decreased demand for current compensation. Non-ESOP plans
cannot borrow money, so the capital-formation temptation described
above is exclusive to ESOPs. 88 Other plans that invest in employer
stock incur some of the other formation-related conflicts, but to a lesser
degree than ESOPs, which invest primarily in employer stock. 89
The conflicts of interest related to buying and selling employer stock
are much more acute in ESOPs than in other plans. As noted, the stock
in 401(k) plans is much more likely to be publicly traded, meaning
valuation issues are far less complicated. 90 Moreover, because non-
ESOP plans cannot borrow money, they are generally not in a position
to buy large blocks of employer stock all at once. They are, therefore,
less useful to insiders, and the transaction-related conflicts are far less
severe.
Likewise, the most serious share-voting conflicts that arise in ESOPs
do not occur in other types of plans. Those issues spring from the
gradual allocation of shares to participants' accounts in leveraged
ESOPs, and other plans cannot be leveraged. 91
E. ERISA's Central Purposes
The additional conflicts of interest arising from ESOPs are not
necessary to the central purposes of ERISA: to safeguard employee
benefits and to encourage employers to maintain benefit plans.92
ERISA recognizes that certain potential conflicts-such as having plan
fiduciaries who are also agents of the sponsoring employer or a
participating union-are effectively unavoidable. 93  Indeed, ERISA's
fiduciary rules make sense primarily as a response to the inevitable
temptations that will confront fiduciaries with multiple loyalties.
That general acceptance of potential conflicts of interest, though,
does not entail a tolerance for additional risks that are both avoidable
and unnecessary to ERISA's purposes. Neither protecting benefits nor
88. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 3.
90. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
93. See ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2006) (providing that ERISA prohibited
transaction rules do not prevent fiduciary from serving "in addition to being an officer, employee,
agent, or other representative of a party in interest"); id. § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (defining
"party in interest" to include sponsoring employer and union "any of whose members are covered
by" the plan).
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encouraging employment-based retirement plans requires the "extra"
conflicts that arise with ESOPs. Apparently recognizing this fact,
ESOP advocates do not claim that ESOPs are good retirement policy.
IV. THE PRO-WORKER ARGUMENTS FOR ESOPs
A few ESOP advocates are content to argue for ESOPs primarily on
the basis of their benefits for employers and company insiders.94 Most,
however, expend more energy claiming that ESOPs are good for
workers. Regardless of whether they use the word "democracy," the
pro-worker arguments ESOP advocates employ boil down to the idea of
economic democratization. That is, they turn on the claim that ESOPs
democratize the distribution of one or more economic values or goods.
For some earlier ESOP advocates, the claim was systemic: ESOPs
would help to reform the entire economy toward broader, more
"democratic" capital ownership and wealth. For most current
advocates, the idea of democratization is implicit rather than explicit,
but their claims nonetheless rest on the idea of broader distribution, this
time of goods such as a "sense of ownership" and control over the
employer's business.
A. Yesterday: ESOPs and "Democratic Capitalism"
In most accounts of ESOP history, Louis Kelso appears as the
founding father. Kelso, an economist, espoused the idea of a
"democratic capitalist economy." By that term, he meant a market
economy in which most people function both as "labor workers" and
"capital workers," earning their living by a combination of labor and
capital ownership and investment.95 In Kelso's view, the fact that most
workers earned a living solely by means of their labor and owned no
capital meant that American democracy was only half of what it could
and should be.96 He believed that finding ways to get capital, in the
form of stock, into workers' hands was vital to moving toward a more
democratic economy in which wealth disparities would be diminished.
97
Kelso found an ally in Senator Russell Long, who engineered the
inclusion of ESOPs in ERISA in 1974.98 Some years later, Senator
Long continued to echo many of Kelso's views. He argued that ESOPs
94. See, e.g., FRISCH, supra note 55, at 5-11.
95. KELSO & KELSO, supra note 47, at 19-20.
96. See id. at 11-22 (discussing "Democracy's Missing Half').
97. See id. at 29 ("[Capital o]wnership must grow in every consumer unit to make that unit
economically autonomous.").
98. See ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 60-61.
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addressed a "fundamental weakness" of the American economy, by
giving more people "a chance to accumulate a capital estate." 99  In
Long's view, ESOPs would create a fairer economy without
"redistributing the wealth of current owners."100
For Kelso, the ESOP was one of many means to spread capital
ownership to middle and working-class Americans.101 He appears to
have pursued ESOPs more actively than the other tools he proposed
because ESOPs presented greater practical opportunities to implement
his ideas. Having designed a number of ESOPs beginning in 1956,
Kelso eventually gained the attention and support of Senator Long,
which led to ESOPs' inclusion in ERISA. 102
According to several ESOP advocates, it was mere "historical
coincidence" that ESOPs made their way into ERISA, rather than some
other piece of legislation: ERISA was merely the "tax train leaving the
station at the time." 10 3  Kelso himself claimed that he introduced the
first ESOP "under the disguise of an employee benefit plan" in order to
give it the best chance of regulatory approval. 10 4 He even went so far as
to refer to the first ESOP as "the Trojan Horse for democratizing
American capitalism."' 1 5 Kelso believed that ESOPs, together with all
his other ideas for diffusing capital ownership, would transform the U.S.
economy into a fully "democratic" one with less disparity of wealth. 10 6
B. Today: Commitment, Satisfaction, and Productivity
Current ESOP advocates have mostly backed away from Kelso's idea
that ESOPs and other forms of employee ownership have the power to
redistribute wealth more evenly across the entire economy. Instead,
99. Russell B. Long, Whose Pie? And Why ESOP's?, CTR. FOR ECON. AND SOC. JUSTICE,
http://www.cesj.org/researchtopics/long-russell/whospie-whyesop.html (last visited Aug. 22,
2009) (containing an excerpt from floor statement of Nov. 17, 1983 on "Employee Stock
Ownership Act of 1983" and reprinted in Congressional Record for July 30-31 and Aug. 1,
1985).
100. Id.
101. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 47, at 51-103 (describing various "financing tools for
democratizing capitalism," including the ESOP, the mutual stock ownership plan (MUSOP), the
consumer stock ownership plan (CSOP), the general stock ownership plan (GSOP), the individual
capital ownership plan (ICOP), the commercial capital ownership plan (COMCOP), the public
capital ownership plan (PUBCOP), and the residential capital ownership plan (RECOP)).
102. See id. at 52-53 (describing initial ESOP designed for Peninsula Newspapers in 1956 and
subsequent pre-ERISA ESOPs); ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 60-61.
103. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 61.
104. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 47, at 53 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. See id. at 56-57 (arguing that ESOPs and other ideas would generate capital ownership
for otherwise "economically underpowered consumers").
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they focus on the company level, arguing that by making employees
part-owners of the companies they work for, ESOPs can help to change
workers' fundamental relationship with their employers and their jobs.
Workers, the argument insists, come to believe that the ESOP
company is "their" company and that their good is bound up with that of
the employer; as a result, they work harder to help the company do
well. 10 7 ESOP participants, advocates say, are more likely to take
"ownership" over their work and to feel satisfied in their jobs. 0 8 In
addition, advocates claim that ESOPs encourage a more peaceful
coexistence between workers and managers. 10 9 According to one
prominent pro-ESOP book, a company with a properly-implemented
ESOP can "eliminate the sense of 'us' and 'them' that pervades
traditional companies."'' 10
ESOP advocates further argue that workers' increased sense of
ownership and commitment leads to enhanced productivity for the
company." 1  The first chapter of the same pro-ESOP book is entitled,
"Ownership: The Performance Additive." 112  The book's authors
characterize ESOPs as "a new model of ownership and management...
that has become a kind of hotbed for workplace innovation and that
seems uniquely suited to the turbulent, topsy-turvy marketplace of the
early twenty-first century." 113  ESOP advocates cite studies, most of
them funded by pro-ESOP groups, for the proposition that ESOP
companies outperform non-ESOP "counterparts" in sales per employee,
productivity, profitability, and longevity. 114 They argue that those
107. See ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 26-28; Press Release, The ESOP Association,
Republican Presidential Candidate Senator John McCain Releases Statement on ESOPs (Sept. 23,
2008), http://www.esopassociation.org/media/mediaMcCainpressrelease.asp (last visited Aug.
22, 2009) (quoting John McCain as saying, "Many Americans are able to 'work for themselves'
through their participation in... ESOPs .... ").
108. One pro-ESOP book uses the term "the equity attitude" to describe a belief among
employee-owners that "[t]his is our company, and we will do whatever is necessary to help it
succeed." ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 26 (emphasis added).
109. See id. at 35 (describing ESOP companies' ability to "alter the assumptions of hierarchy"
found in "conventional" businesses); Long, supra note 99 ("Employee ownership can also help to
create a more widespread unity of interest and incentive, thereby fostering better relations
between management and labor.").
110. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 35.
11. Long, supra note 99 ("[C]ompanies with employee ownership are likely to be more
productive and more profitable than those without, and the more ownership held by employees,
the better the performance of the company.").
112. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 3.
113. Id. at 5.
114. THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, ADVOCACY KIT 11-12 (2009),
http://www.esopassociation.org/pdfs/AdvocacyKit.pdf.
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increases are likely to enhance ESOP companies' chances for long-term
survival and success. 115
Furthermore, ESOP proponents believe that ESOPs' effects on
productivity and other measures directly enhance the well-being of
workers. They argue that added productivity leads to better overall
compensation for workers, and increased company longevity enhances
job security.116 In the words of John McCain during his 2008 campaign
for the presidency, "small and entrepreneurial businesses[, which] are
the lifeblood of the American economy . . . [and] are often unable to
match the substantial health care and other benefits . . . provided by
major corporations . . ., are able to provide employees increased
retirement benefits and stable employment because of ESOPs." 117
Like Kelso before them, today's advocates view the function of
ESOPs as only incidentally including retirement planning. For
example, one prominent ESOP advocate insists, on the website of a pro-
ESOP organization he directs, that "ESOPs are ownership plans," rather
than retirement plans. 118 According to this view, the claimed benefits
of ESOPs occur without regard to their implementation as vehicles for
retirement saving. Presumably, the advocates believe that ESOPs
would still have the same positive effects for workers if they, and their
tax benefits, fit into the statutory scheme somewhere other than in the
realm of ERISA retirement benefit plans.
C. The Flaws Underlying the ESOP Advocates' Position
As noted above, even today's ESOP advocates concede that ESOPs
have done nothing to change disparities in wealth among different strata
115. See ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 11-12 (finding in a specific study that ESOP
companies saw higher productivity levels, greater stability of employment, faster employment
growth, and higher rates of survival).
116. See Press Release, The ESOP Association, supra note 107 (quoting John McCain as
saying, "Research has shown that ESOP-owned companies are usually more productive and
profitable than other companies, as well as having better survival rates").
117. Id.
118. Corey Rosen, Nat'l Ctr. for Employee Ownership, Should ESOPs Be Subject to Stricter
Diversification Rules?, Jan. 8, 2002,
http://www.esopservices.comlegislative%20updates.html#Stricter (last visited Aug. 21, 2009);
cf J. Michael Keeling, President, The ESOP Association, Remarks at the Conference on
Employee Ownership in Grenada, Spain: Employee Ownership in the United States: Focus on the
Employee Stock Ownership Plan, or ESOP, Model (June 5, 2008), available at
http://www.esopassociation.org/about/about-esop_overview.asp (discussing retirement-based
concerns with under-diversification of ESOP assets before going on to extol "the human side of
U.S. ESOP companies-the story of the individuals' working in a company where they have an
ownership share, and where leaders of the company care about their human environment").
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within the American economy. 19 With respect to claimed increases in
worker satisfaction, "labor peace," and productivity, the evidence is
scarcely better. The empirical researchers most cited by ESOP
advocates have found no clear connection between employee stock
ownership and worker satisfaction, and one of them has concluded that
ESOPs do not promote labor peace. 120  The same researchers found
only a tenuous link between employee stock ownership and
productivity. Summarizing other research, they found that two out of
nine studies had found a positive correlation between stock ownership
and productivity and none of them found a negative correlation. 12 1
Other scholars have noted weaknesses even in that limited finding.
For one thing, companies adopting new ESOPs often have relatively
high growth rates leading up to adoption. Any post-adoption increases
in productivity measures could simply be a continuation of the trend. 122
More fundamentally, claims of increased productivity do not account
for the effects of management actions that ESOP companies might
adopt. Sophisticated ESOP advocates concede that an "equity attitude"
among employees, which causes the alleged productivity gains, does not
arise automatically because a company establishes an ESOP. 123
Instead, they admit that companies must do much more-in the way of
education, information sharing, and "business disciplines" such as
participatory management and incentive compensation-in order to
change traditional attitudes about work and the relationship between
management and workers. 124
119. See JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASi, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 114
(1988) (finding that employee-ownership law, as exemplified in ESOPs, "has reproduced the
system of economic stratification in American society rather than attempting to reverse it"). I put
Blasi in the general category of "ESOP advocates" because he continues to see positive
possibilities for ESOPs despite his often strong critiques of ESOP law in its current form. In any
event, others who are more unambiguously pro-ESOP now eschew Kelso-style claims that
ESOPs can reduce wealth disparities.
120. See id. at 241 (concluding that present forms of employee ownership, including ESOPs,
continue or even strengthen "the rigid and adversarial roles of labor and management in the large
majority of cases"); Douglas Kruse & Joseph Blasi, Employee Ownership, Employee Attitudes,
and Firm Performance 24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5277, 1995),
available at http://www.nber.orglpapers/w5277 (noting a split in studies regarding satisfaction
and concluding that "[e]mployee ownership does not ... automatically improve employee
attitudes and behavior").
121. Kruse & Blasi, supra note 120, at 25. The study's authors estimated, based on "meta-
analyses" of other studies, a "productivity difference" between ESOP and non-ESOP firms of
6.2%, but they cautioned, "high standard errors keep most individual estimates from being
statistically significant... " Id.
122. Benartzi et al., supra note 2, at 57.
123. See ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 26-31 (introducing the term "equity attitude").
124. See id. at 95-97 (discussing such in Part III: "Building a Successful Equity-Based
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Assuming that companies with ESOPs also taking these additional
steps actually do experience increased productivity over companies that
are comparable in other respects, it seems an obvious response to ask
whether the non-ESOP changes might be producing the increases
without regard to the ESOP. Claims certainly abound that various
participatory management techniques can themselves lead to better
productivity. 125  Even if some link to compensation is necessary in
order to enhance productivity, it is by no means clear that the link must
be in the form of an ESOP. Other, less risky ways of tying
compensation to company or unit performance might work just as well
or even better. 126 Yet ESOP advocates make no effort to disambiguate
the possible causes of the productivity increases they posit.
Thus, advocates concede that ESOPs are not sufficient to cause
increased productivity. They simply assume, without evidence, that
ESOPs are necessary for the purported increases, in conjunction with
other measures. It is at least equally plausible that any productivity
increases that may occur are due to other measures that ESOP
companies take, rather than the ESOPs themselves.
Finally, even if ESOPs did cause an incremental increase in
productivity, that effect would still be outweighed by ESOPs' profound
dangers for workers. Neither the old, "democratic capitalism"
arguments nor the newer, satisfaction-and-productivity arguments for
ESOPs seem sufficient to justify ESOPs in light of the problems of non-
diversification and conflicts of interest described in this Article.
Although promoted with arguments based on economic
democratization, ESOPs have at most dubious benefits for workers,
contrasted with very real disadvantages and dangers.
V. STRATEGIES FOR REFORM
So what should Congress do about ESOPs? Or should Congress
leave matters as they are, trusting market forces to solve ESOPs'
problems?
Company"); id. at 161-62 (discussing incentive compensation). Rosen and his co-authors
mention such techniques as "work cells, self-managing teams .... open-book management ....
[and] devolution of authority to lower levels ...." Id. at 37.
125. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An
Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 990-92 (1998) (describing
"conventional wisdom" as to positive effects of participatory management on worker satisfaction,
commitment, and productivity).
126. See ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 161 (advocating bonuses related to performance);
Hansmann, supra note 82, at 1811 (suggesting that a "package consisting of a well-diversified
pension fund and a profit-sharing compensation plan" would be preferable to an ESOP).
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A. Self-Regulation by Labor Markets
Perhaps labor markets can take account of ESOPs' defects and
resolve matters satisfactorily. On this view, employers with "bad"
retirement plans, such as ESOPs, will either be forced to improve other
areas of compensation or lose high-quality workers, thereby suffering a
competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis their non-ESOP competitors. If
these market mechanisms work efficiently, it might be acceptable for
Congress to leave the law as it is.
The assumption, though, is a large one. It requires that workers be
generally able and willing to switch employers due to perceived
differences in retirement plan risks. It also demands that workers
understand and correctly value such risks and their implications for the
workers' future. A general discussion of mobility within labor markets
is beyond the scope of this Article, but there is a good deal of evidence
that workers-and, for that matter, many employers--do not
comprehend the risks of investing retirement funds in employer stock.
In the 401(k) context, scholars have noted that workers are prone to
underestimating the likelihood that their employer will go bankrupt, or
even that the employer's stock will do anything but continually increase
in value. 127  Nor do workers or employers understand the long-term
negative effects of under-diversification on the value of retirement
savings. 128 Any appeal to labor markets to blunt the ill effects of
ESOPs runs contrary to these realities. Workers cannot efficiently
abandon employers with bad retirement plans or demand adequate
substitute compensation if they are not aware of what makes a plan
risky or how to measure the dangers accurately.
Moreover, the notion that the market will solve the problem seems
odd, given that retirement plans exist in a zone of pervasive regulation
and government incentives. 129 Congress encourages retirement plans
generally, and ESOPs in particular, making it very difficult to identify a
meaningful baseline "market."
127. See Benartzi et al., supra note 2, at 56 (noting a survey finding that six of ten employees
believe their company's stock is either safer or no riskier than a diversified fund with many
stocks); Stabile, supra note 2, at 547-52.
128. See Benartzi et al., supra note 2, at 53-56, 62-63 (discussing the costs to employees and
employers regarding the risk of company stock).
129. In addition to ERISA and substantial portions of the Internal Revenue Code, retirement
plans are also subject to voluminous regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor and the
Department of Treasury.
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B. Diversification and Disclosure Requirements
One possible regulatory approach to ESOPs might be the one
Congress adopted with respect to 401(k) plans in the aftermath of the
Enron debacle. Even though many in academia and elsewhere called
for Congress to limit or proscribe 401(k) plans' ownership of employer
stock, 130 Congress chose the far more limited course of setting
enhanced diversification requirements and disclosure rules. Participants
in 401(k)-type plans now have a statutory right to diversify immediately
their own contributions to the plan and, after three years of service with
the employer, they have the right to diversify employer contributions as
well. 131 In addition, plans must provide participants with information
regarding their diversification rights and the importance of diversified
retirement investing.' 32
From the perspective of plan administrators and company insiders,
such requirements in the ESOP context would represent a serious
imposition. In privately-owned companies, where some 97 percent of
ESOPs reside, the company has to buy back the ESOP shares of
participants who "cash out" through retirement or diversification. 133 If
participants actually took advantage of enhanced diversification
requirements, companies would face less predictable buy-back
responsibilities. 134 Companies and insiders might also lose some of the
benefits of ESOPs described above in Part IV if participants took
advantage of new diversification opportunities and significantly reduced
the amount of employer stock held in ESOPs.
In any event, the diversification and disclosure route would not fully
resolve the problem of under-diversification, especially for leveraged
ESOPs, and it would therefore leave much of ESOP participants'
savings unnecessarily vulnerable. A significant majority of ESOPs are
of the leveraged variety. In a leveraged ESOP transaction, the shares of
stock that the ESOP buys stand as security for the loan of the purchase
money. 135 The shares remain in a suspense account and are released
130. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 2, at 77-81 (advocating a complete ban on all 401(k)
investment in employer stock); Stabile, supra note 2, at 557-58 (describing legislation
introduced, but later withdrawn, by Senators John Corzine and Barbara Boxer that would have
imposed a 20 percent cap on employer stock in 401(k) plans).
131. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
133. See I.R.C. § 409(h) (2006) (governing a participant's "right to require that the employer
repurchase employer securities under a fair valuation formula").
134. See Rosen, supra note 118, at 2.
135. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3(e) (2009) (outlining the liability and collateral of ESOP for
loan).
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and allocated to participants' accounts only in proportion to the amount
of the loan's principal and interest the ESOP has repaid. 136 It does not
seem workable to suggest that participants could diversify their ESOP
holdings by selling company shares that are still necessary as security
for the ESOP's lenders. Accordingly, any enhanced diversification
requirement would only affect the shares that have been allocated to
participants' accounts. 137  In leveraged ESOPs, therefore, such
requirements would have very little effect for years after the leveraged
transaction.
Even in non-leveraged ESOPs, diversification requirements are
unlikely to solve the under-diversification problem. As noted, workers
often do not understand the implications of non-diversified retirement
investing.138 That tendency persists despite attempts to educate workers
about the risks involved. 139  Scholars have begun to trace the
psychological phenomena that might explain workers' "irrational"
investment decisions in the 401(k) context,14 0 and there is no reason to
think that the tendencies are any less pronounced among ESOP
participants.
In any event, it seems a strange solution to require ESOPs to allow
and encourage their participants to invest in assets other than employer
stock. ESOPs are, after all, specifically designed to invest in employer
stock. If, against the odds, diversification requirements were successful
in achieving significant diversification, then they would to that same
extent spell the end of ESOPs as they currently exist. If we want to get
rid of ESOPs, it is at least arguable that we should do it more
directly. 141
C. Requiring "Companion" Plans
Another idea is that having workers participate in additional, non-
ESOP retirement plans might offset the dangers of ESOPs. On this
theory, Congress could require any employer that sponsors an ESOP to
136. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 54.4975-7, 54.4975-11 (discussing release from encumbrance and
allocation to participants' accounts); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3(h) (discussing release from
encumbrance).
137. Cf I.R.C. § 401(a)(28) (applying existing, limited diversification requirements for
ESOPs to specified portions "of the participant's account in the plan").
138. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
139. See Stabile, supra note 2, at 552-55 (citing evidence that improved disclosure and
education do little to improve investment allocation decisions and noting even lower likelihood of
improvement with respect to investment in employer stock).
140. See id. at 547-52 (describing behavioral theory explanations for employees' choices to
invest heavily in employer stock).
141. See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
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sponsor another retirement plan as well, either a fully-diversified 401(k)
or other defined contribution plan, or a traditional, defined benefit
pension plan. 142 In the course of critiquing 401(k) plans for placing
many of the risks and responsibilities of retirement saving on workers,
Richard Kaplan has suggested that employers should have to pair their
401(k) plans with another type of defined benefit or defined
contribution plan. 143 In the ESOP context, such a requirement would at
least mean that workers would not have their retirement savings
invested solely in employer stock.
But merely requiring employers to maintain an additional plan could
not be the sole feature of this idea; it would have to be only the
beginning. Such a scheme would also have to regulate how employers
could divide contributions between the plans; otherwise, an employer
could simply design the companion plan to receive very little money
and funnel nearly all the contributions to the ESOP instead. If Congress
required both that ESOP companies maintain a diversified plan and that
they observe an even division of contributions between that plan and the
ESOP, workers would still begin with half their retirement savings
invested in employer stock. But even ESOP advocates agree that such a
percentage is far too high. 144 Depending on the performance of the
employer's stock compared to the other plan's portfolio, that
concentration might increase further over time.
If the idea of requiring a companion plan were to have a chance of
truly addressing the problem of under-diversification, Congress would
have to go beyond even a flat mandate of contribution levels. It would
have to set the initial balance of contributions so that each participant
had no more than a given percentage of his or her total plan assets in the
ESOP. Then, Congress would need to require that the employer adjust
future contribution levels to maintain each participant's ESOP balance
below that ceiling, taking into account changes due to investment
performance.
Thus conceived, the companion-plan requirement would entail a
fantastic degree of regulatory oversight. In any event, like the
diversification-plus-disclosure idea discussed above, it would
essentially amount to a roundabout way of writing ESOPs out of ERISA
and the tax code entirely. Requiring paired plans with a ceiling on each
participant's ESOP balance relative to the companion plan is
142. See supra note 40 (explaining "defined contribution" and "defined benefit" plans).
143. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 69-70.
144. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 15 (acknowledging that having more than 20 percent of
one's retirement savings in company stock is "probably too much concentration").
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functionally the same as maintaining a single plan with a cap on the
amount any worker can invest in employer stock. Because of the
onerous regulatory implications, this idea would likely be no easier to
enact than an outright ban on ESOPs.
D. Solutions Addressing ESOPs' Conflicts of Interest
One might imagine a different set of possible reforms aimed at
addressing some of the conflict-of-interest issues identified in Part III.
Specifically, different approaches might seek to address conflicts
relating to ESOP adoption, ESOP transactions, and voting of ESOP
shares.
1. Worker Voting on ESOP Adoption
With respect to ESOP formation, Congress might require companies
to let workers vote on whether to adopt an ESOP. 145 But as we have
already seen, many workers do not fully understand, or do not rationally
react to, the risks inherent in investing retirement assets in employer
stock. 146 Even if the worker-approval idea incorporated mandatory
education, it would still be unlikely to redress the current imbalance of
power in favor of insiders. 14
7
2. Participant Control Over ESOP Transactions
Congress could try to redress transaction-related conflicts of interest
by requiring participant approval for share purchases and for sales
outside the normal course of retirement. 148  It could also mandate
participant involvement, or even control, over the hiring and retention
of independent fiduciaries and valuation experts. 
149
The first option runs into the same difficulties as the other worker-
approval proposals discussed above. In addition, participants would
have little information available in deciding whether to approve a share
transaction aside from the opinions of the fiduciary and the valuation
expert. Therefore, the second option-giving workers control over the
hiring and firing of those service providers-holds more promise. Over
time, participant control over those decisions might make fiduciaries
145. Ezra S. Field, Note, Money for Nothing and Leverage for Free: The Politics and History
of the Leveraged ESOP Tax Subsidy, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 740, 783-84 (1997).
146. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
148. Cf supra note 133 and accompanying text (describing an ESOP company's obligation to
buy back participants' shares at retirement).
149. See generally supra Part II.B and accompanying notes (discussing conflicts of interest in
hiring of ESOP fiduciaries and valuation experts under current ERISA legislation).
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and valuation firms more protective of participants' interests and less
solicitous of management.
Transaction decisions, however, are only a subsidiary part of the
ESOP problem. Even if Congress could reform the process governing
such decisions, it would leave unaddressed the grave problems of non-
diversification. It would also beg the question whether implementing an
ESOP can ever be a good idea for workers.
3. Voting Reforms
Similarly, reforms to the voting rules for ESOP stock could afford
workers some protection against specific conflicts of interest, but they
would not address the other fundamental issues with respect to ESOPs.
Congress could, for instance, require pass-through voting on all matters
and constrain ESOP trustees to vote unallocated shares in proportion to
the participants' voting of their allocated shares. 150 This proposal,
however, does not account for information asymmetries between
workers and managers or for the likelihood that some workers will
forgo voting entirely due to the small number of shares each can
control. More fundamentally, these ideas would not address non-
diversification or the deep conflicts surrounding ESOP formation.
E. Elimination of ESOPs
A more direct approach would be to do away with the ESOP as a
separate form of retirement plan. Congress could repeal all exceptions
and incentives for ESOPs, leaving the law as it stands with respect to
employer stock in 401(k)-type plans. The benefit of such an approach
would be to eliminate the leveraged ESOP and all the particular ills that
flow from it. This approach would also repeal the ESOP-specific tax
benefits for selling shareholders and others. 151
The major shortcoming of the ESOP ban is that it would leave the
current rules in place with respect to 401(k)-type plans' investments in
employer stock. As others have pointed out, the post-Enron disclosure-
and-diversification rules are insufficient to redress the non-
diversification dangers of such investments. 152 Still, doing away with
ESOPs as a separate form of plan would be a great stride forward.
150. See McDonnell, supra note 83, at 259.
151. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
152. See Benartzi et al., supra note 2, at 67 (attributing employees' failure to diversify
portfolios to inertia effects); Stabile, supra note 2, at 553-55 (discussing other pressures-such as
company loyalty, employer-matched contributions, and optimistic biases-counteracting
employee diversification education).
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F. Cap or Prohibition on Plan Investment in Employer Stock
Finally, the most sweeping reforms would consist of capping the
amount of employer stock any participant could have in her defined
contribution plans, perhaps at the 10 percent level currently applicable
to defined benefit plans, 153 or banning all retirement plan investment in
employer stock. A cap would involve significant compliance expenses,
due to the need to recalculate each participant's proportion of employer
stock as prices fluctuate. 154  It would, however, allow employees to
hold stock in their employer and obtain the tax advantages attendant
upon retirement plans, but without incurring an inordinate risk from
non-diversification. 155
Ultimately, banning all employer stock in retirement plans is the most
direct solution, and probably the best. It would protect workers from all
the dangers peculiar to ESOPs, and, after a transition period, it would
involve relatively few compliance costs.
G. The Political Reality Regarding Proposed Solutions
If the post-Enron experience with 401(k) reform is any measure, none
of the proposed reforms is particularly likely to pass Congress. 15
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ESOP trade groups, which represent ESOP companies and service
providers such as institutional fiduciaries and valuation companies,
would vigorously resist reform. 157 As Senator McCain's pro-ESOP
statement suggests, some members of Congress take the position that
ESOPs are good for workers. 158 Moreover, the more sweeping reforms,
such as limiting or prohibiting investment in employer stock by 401(k)
plans as well as ESOPs, run up against the idea that workers should be
153. See ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (2006) ("A plan may not acquire any
qualifying employer security or qualifying employer real property, if immediately after such
acquisition the aggregate fair market value of employer securities and employer real property held
by the plan exceeds 10 percent of the fair market value of the assets of the plan.").
154. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 78 (noting that caps "require constant monitoring as the
market value of the plan's various securities fluctuate").
155. See WILLIAM E. EVEN & DAVID MACPHERSON, DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
SEC. ADMIN., THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PENSION FUND HOLDINGS OF EMPLOYER
STOCK 38 (2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/EvenMacpherson0404.pdf
(projecting that a 10 percent cap on employer stock in all pension plans, including ESOPs, would
reduce rate of return by less than one-half a percentage point but would reduce standard deviation
of returns by approximately 50 percent, assuming employer stock was replaced by investment in
value-weighted market composite index).
156. See Stabile, supra note 2, at 557-58 ("[N]either a percentage limit nor a provision
discouraging matching contributions in employer stock was politically viable.").
157. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 79 (describing employers' resistance to 401(k) reforms after
Enron).
158. See supra notes 107, 116 and accompanying text.
20091
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
allowed to choose their own investments, even if they choose
unwisely. 159
It is at least possible, though, that the corporate failures and stock
market declines of 2008 and 2009 might improve the legislative climate
for ESOP-related reforms. High-profile bankruptcies in ESOP
companies highlight the severe risk ESOPs place on workers. 160 Recent
episodes involving banking and other high-profile sectors might have
enhanced Congress' suspicion of conflicts of interest in the corporate
milieu. Perhaps members of Congress could be made to understand the
damage that non-diversification does to participants' retirement savings,
and the dangers of unnecessary conflicts of interest that ESOPs entail.
VI. A WORD ABOUT POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
One might ask, why limit the critique posed in this Article to ESOPs
and employer stock, or even to retirement plans? People make all sorts
of under-diversified investments and other decisions with seemingly
poor risk characteristics. Entrepreneurs gamble their families' nest eggs
on new business ventures, for instance, even though their savings
would, on average, be better invested in a diversified portfolio.
The premise behind the entire enterprise of ERISA and relevant parts
of the tax code is that retirement savings occupy a special place in the
national economy. In simplistic terms, those statutory rules, along with
such mechanisms as Social Security and Medicare, reflect a judgment
that dire poverty among the elderly is not tolerable. On that idea, we
have built a superstructure of tax advantages and regulations regarding
private retirement plans.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to peer beneath that foundational
premise. Given a system of incentives and regulations, the question
becomes how best to adjust those devices to achieve the stated goals.
The conclusion that we should not allow extreme under-diversification
in tax-advantaged retirement savings, then, does not necessarily imply
that the same should be true beyond that realm. There might or might
not be good reasons to regulate individuals' poor or "irrational"
investment choices in other contexts, but such reasons are not part of
this Article. 16 1
159. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 2, at 80-81 (criticizing the "participant choice" argument).
160. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
161. The same is true, albeit for different reasons, of implications for other examples of bad
decision making with respect to retirement investing. For instance, workers who direct their own
investments in defined contribution plans often choose levels of equity investment that are
suboptimal for the workers' retirement needs-such as investing too lightly in equities when far
from retirement or too heavily when close to retirement. It is certainly plausible that regulatory
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VII. CONCLUSION
ESOP advocates promote ESOPs as being good for workers, as
desirable instruments of economic democratization. In reality, however,
ESOPs expose workers to dramatic, uncompensated investment risks in
comparison to diversified retirement plans. In addition, ESOPs
heighten the temptations and opportunities for insiders to prefer their
own interests, and those of the company, over the best interests of the
worker-participants.
Congress should address these problems by prohibiting retirement
plan investment in employer stock. Failing that, Congress should, at a
minimum, repeal the exceptions and incentives that allow ESOPs to
exist as tax-advantaged retirement plans.
changes might be an appropriate response to such errors, but it is not self-evident based on the
limited conclusions regarding ESOPs in this Article. Government control over retirement
investments beyond the relatively small subset of employer stock might have unintended effects
on capital markets, and there are likely other considerations that would merit separate analysis.
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